

COMMUNIST CHINA

The People's Republic of China

the Taiwan Straits. Shortly thereafter, Korea showed the intention of pressing on toward the Yalu. Because of this, the Chinese government told the United States government that United States troops crossed the Yalu River. This was a lie. The United States through the Indian government disregarded this and did indeed cross the 38th Parallel and the Yalu River.

Why did the United States only take the action of voluntary withdrawal of troops from the Yalu River, and not until the 38th Parallel and afterwards made many statements during the act of aggression against China. Moreover, he could not have stationed United States troops in Korea. Furthermore, Truman failed to demand an armistice was at last achieved. *troops had withdrawn completely.* United States troops are still in Korea. Moreover, the United States Navy and Air Force are in Korea. Isn't this the best proof that the United States continues to pursue policies of aggression? It is not necessary to cite any bases maintained by the United States. *any aggressive military pacts target. China, on the other hand, the treaties it has signed are all treaties of peace and*

committed these acts of aggression to settle disputes with

the United States? No! I declared already during the Bandung Conference in 1955 that the Chinese people were friendly to the American people and the Chinese government was willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States government to discuss existing disputes between the two countries, though the two countries had not recognized each other and had no diplomatic relations. This proposal of ours resulted, through the good offices of Britain, in ambassadorial talks between China and the United States which started August 1, 1955, in Geneva.

"In order to create a favorable atmosphere China released, before the talks began, eleven so-called 'prisoners of war,' following the mediation of Krishna Menon and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's visit to Peking. Why are they referred to as so-called 'prisoners of war'? Because they were not captured on the Korean battlefield. With the exception of a few who chose, of their own will, to stay behind, all prisoners of war captured on the Korean front were repatriated after the armistice. Later, among those who stayed behind, some returned also of their own will. But the eleven so-called 'prisoners of war' were on a United States plane which intruded into China's air space, and were captured after their plane was hit. Both China and the United States had declared that the Korean War was restricted to Korea and did not extend to China. This plane was shot down in China. So China did not recognize them as 'prisoners of war.' Nevertheless, China released them—to create a favorable atmosphere for the ambassadorial talks at Geneva.

"That was the end of the so-called 'prisoners of war' issue.

"Besides the so-called 'prisoners of war,' however, there were two other categories of United States nationals in Chinese prisons. First were United States citizens, guilty of such crimes as sabotage and espionage, or who had in other ways violated the laws of China. Since 1955, we have released twenty-five such United States criminals when their terms were fully served or were granted clemency and released ahead of time for good behavior. One of the twenty-five chose to remain in China after his release. Of this category only three are now still serving sentences in China.

"There are two United States nationals in Chinese prisons of another category—a very special one. They are airborne

45
9
50

The China Reader
Communist China
edited by Franz
Schurman and Urville
Schell p.223
as excerpted from
The Other Side of
the River by Edgar
Snow

COMMUNIST CHINA

secret agents sent by the United States to China, namely, the very famous Downey and Fecteau. Allen Dulles of the United States Central Intelligence Agency could give you all the details, but perhaps he wouldn't want to give the information in such detail as we would. In early 1955, when Hammarskjöld came to Peking to discuss the question of the United States nationals in Chinese prisons, even he found it inconvenient to bring up their case for discussion. These two were in no way related to the Korean War, but were on a mission of pure espionage and secret-agent activity. If you are interested, I could show you some portions of the notes of my talks with Hammarskjöld for your reference. The notes have never been published.

"Five years have elapsed since the start of the Chinese-United States talks in August 1955. At the very outset, we proposed that disputes between China and the United States, including the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States blocked all news of this proposal, but China later published it. Why did [John Foster] Dulles reject it? Because Dulles realized that reaching such an agreement implied that the next step would be discussions on how and when United States armed forces were to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

"We hold that the dispute between China and the United States in the Taiwan region is an international question; whereas military action between the Central Government of New China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan is an internal question. The United States has maintained that the two questions are inseparable. We hold that they can and must be separated. Since it has been possible for China and the United States to hold ambassadorial talks in Geneva and Warsaw, talks can also be held at the same time between the Central Government of China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The former is an international question while the latter is an internal question. Parallel talks can be conducted and solutions reached separately.

"In the talks between China and the United States, agreement on principle must after all be reached first before concrete issues can be settled. The two points of principle on which agreement should be reached are:

The People's Republic of China

"(1) All disputes between the United States and China, including the dispute in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force.

"(2) The United States should withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, and should cease to provide military and economic aid to the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan. This is the logical conclusion which should be reached.

"This is the crux of the United States' active policy toward China. The active policy toward China has been the policy of the United States. In this respect, the United States and the Democratic Parties aim at the same thing. It is probably be opposed not only by the Kuomintang in Taiwan but also by the United States government. Such an approach would be a disaster for Sino-U.S. relations if it were to be adopted.

"We believe that a solution will eventually be found; it is only a matter of time. The point is: if the United States continues its policy of aggression and the threat of war against China, we do not believe that the United States will allow their government and the United States to prevail. There is no conflict of basic interests between China and the United States.

I asked Chou whether it had been the topic of discussion for the ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.

THE PREMIER: Yes, it was discussed by China at the end of 1954 and forward in the autumn of 1955.

QUESTION: Does the United States still have the question of the time from Taiwan?

States, including the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force; and

"(2) The United States must agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are matters for subsequent discussion. If the United States government ceases to pursue the policy of aggression against China and of resorting to threats of force, this is the only logical conclusion which can be drawn.

"This is the crux of the dispute between China and the United States. The activities and direction of United States policy toward China have been aimed at manufacturing 'two Chinas.' In this respect, both the Republican and the Democratic Parties aim at the same thing. . . . This scheme would probably be opposed not only by Mainland China, but also by the Kuomintang in Taiwan and the Chinese in Taiwan. Therefore such an approach would lead nowhere, but in the solution of Sino-U.S. relations it would tie things up in knots.

"We believe that a solution to Sino-U.S. relations will ultimately be found; it is only a question of time. But there is one point: if the United States does not give up its policy of aggression and the threat of war against China, no solution is possible. We do not believe that the people of the United States will allow their government indefinitely to pursue such a policy. *There is no conflict of basic interest between the peoples of China and the United States, and friendship will eventually prevail.*"

I asked Chou whether the two principles he spoke of had been the topic of discussion for a long time in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.

THE PREMIER: Yes. The first principle was put forward by China at the end of 1955. The second principle was put forward in the autumn of 1958 at Warsaw.

QUESTION: Does the second principle include as well the question of the time and manner of the withdrawal from Taiwan?